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767 
“If You Poison Us Do We Not Die?”—A Critical Analysis of 
the Legality of Poison Puts in the Wake of San Antonio  
Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin, Inc. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 1980s was a decade of big hair, power suits, and hostile 
takeovers. While the impact of many of the decade’s trends has 
slowly faded, the takeover wave of the ’80s changed corporate 
governance in a lasting way. The increase in hostile takeover bids 
gave rise to new and innovative antitakeover tactics by boards of 
directors. Among these tactics is the infamous collection of “poison 
pills, greenmail, the ‘Pac Man’ defense, white knights, and golden 
parachutes.”1 Despite the prevalence of these defenses, a similar, and 
oft-used provision—the “poison put”—had not been the subject of 
litigation until recently. In 2009, San Antonio Fire & Police Pension 
Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 a case with two poison puts 
at issue, broke the silence in this critical area of the law. 
In Amylin, the provisions were a particular kind of poison put— 
“proxy puts.” A proxy put is a provision in a debt contract that 
accelerates the bondholder’s rights in a contract when a change 
occurs in the majority of the board of directors without the approval 
of the incumbent directors.3 Once a change triggers the provision, 
the bondholder can sell back the bonds at par value. In Amylin, two 
prominent shareholders of Amylin Pharmaceuticals nominated five-
person slates for spots on the company’s board of directors.4 
Consequently, if all ten nominees succeeded in their proxy elections 
and ousted the incumbent directors, the change would have affected 
the majority of the eleven-person board and would have triggered 
proxy puts in an Amylin debt indenture and credit agreement.5 This 
 
 1. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder 
Protection or Management Entrenchment, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931, 944 (1993). 
 2. 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009). 
 3. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 7, San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin 
Pharms., Inc., 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009) (No. 268). 
 4. San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms, Inc., C.A. No. 4446-
VCL at 4 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2009), http://law.du.edu/documents/corporate-
governance/governance-cases/Antonio-Fire-Police-Memorandum-Opinion.pdf. 
 5. Id. 
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possibility was problematic because, at that time, the bonds were 
trading so far below par value that if they were put back to Amylin 
the company would likely become insolvent.6 The plaintiff in the 
case, a pension fund and Amylin shareholder, sued Amylin for, 
among other things, injunctive relief invalidating the proxy puts.7 
Neither Vice Chancellor Lamb of the Delaware Court of Chancery 
nor the Delaware Supreme Court went as far as invalidating the 
provisions, however, and both courts gave the Amylin board of 
directors the beneficial deference of the business judgment rule.8 
In examining the Delaware courts’ decisions in Amylin, this 
Note critically analyzes the legality of poison put provisions 
generally, and proxy puts specifically. While I do not assert that 
poison puts, or even proxy puts, should be per se illegal, I propose a 
rule that when a board of directors decides to include a proxy put in 
an agreement, it must demonstrate a compelling justification for 
doing so. In making this argument, I am not attempting to argue for 
either side of the current debate on an increased shareholder role.9 
Rather, I argue that proxy puts infringe on “shareholders’ statutorily 
defined role,”10 by infringing on the shareholder franchise’s 
recognized right to vote in a contested election of directors.  
This Note will bolster this proposed rule through an examination 
of the policy behind poison put provisions, their fiduciary duty 
implications, and their infringement on shareholder authority. Part II 
begins with a survey of poison put provisions generally, reviewing 
 
 6. Id. at 8. 
 7. Id. at 9. 
 8. See San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 981 A.2d 
1173 (Del. 2009); Amylin, C.A. No. 4446-VCL. 
 9. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing for an alternative regime allowing shareholders a more prominent 
corporate governance). But see Leo E. Strine, Toward a True Corporate Republic, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 1759 (2006) (addressing Bebchuk’s article from the view of an “open-minded 
corporate law ‘traditionalist’”). 
 10. Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder 
Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 299 (2001). Like Professors 
Robert Thompson and Gordon Smith, I am not trying to advocate the “broad general 
preference for shareholder decision making that frightened judges in the aftermath of the 
director passivity discussions of the early 1980s.” Id. at 46. Rather, I argue that while 
“directors may use defensive tactics to protect other constituencies or to gain higher returns 
for shareholders” and that “shareholders are capable of using their power to prefer themselves 
over other corporate constituencies,” shareholder voting falls within the “limited and 
nuanced” sacred space that “emanates from the shareholders’ statutorily defined role.” See 
generally id.  
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and examining the potential benefits that poison puts can have on 
bondholders, shareholders, and directors respectively. Part II also 
considers the particular detriments that poison puts might bring to 
the firm through the agency cost framework. This section highlights 
particularly problematic aspects of proxy puts and demonstrates why 
they should be subjected to heightened legal scrutiny. Part III 
focuses on the legal standards for hostile takeovers and the 
implications that fiduciary duty law has on these change of control 
covenants. Part IV recounts the facts and analysis from Amylin, and 
Part V discusses how although the court was correct in concluding 
that the directors’ actions would normally be safe under the business 
judgment rule, in the instant case, allowing proxy put provisions in 
the agreements should have required a compelling justification, and 
the provisions should have been invalidated. 
II. POISON PUTS GENERALLY 
Proxy puts are a form of change of control covenants (more 
infamously known as “poison puts”) used in debt indentures. The 
purported purpose of these covenants is to shield bondholders from 
takeover-related losses.11 Because issuers are offering this protection, 
they can theoretically issue the bonds at lower interest rates.12 Poison 
puts consist of two parts: a trigger and a remedy.13 The trigger is 
normally either a takeover-related event (e.g., an acquisition or a 
change in the board’s majority through the proxy process), or the 
downgrading of a bond’s credit rating, or both.14 The bondholder’s 
remedy is either a put—the right to sell the bonds to the company at 
a set price—or an increased interest rate on the bonds.15 In the case 
of a proxy put, bondholders can sell back their bonds at par value 
when there is a change in the majority of the board that has not been 
approved by the incumbent directors—regardless of the current 
value of the bonds. Again, the purported purpose of poison puts is to 
 
 11. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 934; see Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, 
Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 620 (2003) 
(noting that some “change of control provisions serve legitimate purposes in certain  
situation . . . . Penalty provisions may improve the joint welfare of contracting parties when 
third parties can expect to suffer losses in the event of a change of control . . . .”). 
 12. Kahan & Kausner, supra note 1, at 940. 
 13. Id. at 936. 
 14. Id. at 936–37. 
 15. Id. at 937. 
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protect the bondholders, but, particularly with proxy puts, the 
board’s underlying motivation is potentially problematic. Much of 
the debate surrounding poison puts centers on a key question: is the 
purpose of the covenant to protect bondholders from take-over 
related losses (and thus increase the value of the firm) or is it to 
entrench the board of directors (and thus decrease the value of the 
firm)?16 
A. Benefits of Poison Puts 
Theoretically, change of control covenants can provide value to 
bondholders, shareholders, and directors.17 In an excellent 
examination of poison puts, their effects, and the motivation for 
including them in debt indentures, Professors Marcel Kahan and 
Michael Klausner gave critical insight that assists in determining if 
and when poison put provisions should be legal. In this section, I 
will summarize their arguments and conclusions regarding the 
potential value of poison puts to bondholders, shareholders, and 
directors. First, I will address how poison puts allegedly serve 
bondholder interest by protecting against the increased leverage that 
can accompany an acquisition or recapitalization. Second, I will 
consider how this bondholder benefit can reduce a firm’s agency cost 
of debt and, in turn, increase its value and benefit the shareholders. 
Finally, I will examine the managerial interests in these provisions.  
1. Bondholder protection 
Take-over related events can potentially harm bondholders by 
increasing a firm’s leverage and therefore decreasing its ability to 
repay its bonds. As an issuing corporation increases in leverage, its 
credit rating (which measures its ability to repay its bonds) 
decreases.18 For instance, empirical studies show that leveraged 
acquisitions in the 1980s decreased the values of outstanding bonds 
by 5–7%.19 Bonds are considered low-risk investments, and such a 
 
 16. See id.; see also Arlen & Talley, supra note 11 (“Although many existing penalty 
change of control provisions are value enhancing, managers subject to shareholder choice 
could readily employ such provisions defensively, at shareholders’ expense.”).  
 17. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 980. 
 18. See, e.g., id. at 937–50. 
 19. Id. at 940 (citing Arthur Warga & Ivo Welch, Bondholder Losses in Leveraged 
Buyouts, 6 REV. FIN. STUD. 959, 979 (1993)); Paul Asquith & Thierry Wizman, Event Risk, 
Covenants, and Bondholder Returns in Leveraged Buyouts, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 203 (1990). 
DO NOT DELETE 4/16/2010  3:58 PM 
767 A Critical Analysis of the Legality of Poison Puts 
 771 
decrease can be problematic for bondholders. However, a poison put 
provision can reduce the risk of bond depreciation by assuring 
bondholders that the possible decrease in credit rating accompanied 
by a take-over will be recompensed, either by a put option at a 
predetermined price or an interest rate adjustment.20 Because 
bondholders receive this insurance, corporations can theoretically 
issue bonds with poison puts at lower interest rates.21 
2. Shareholder benefits 
Shareholders benefit from change of control covenants if the 
provisions can succeed in increasing the overall value of the firm—
i.e., “the aggregate value of the firm’s stocks and bonds.”22 In 
analyzing the possible benefits of poison puts, Kahan and Klausner 
used the Jensen and Meckling agency cost framework23 to examine a 
poison put’s impact on the agency cost of debt.24 
At first blush, conflict arises because shareholders’ interests can 
be inapposite to bondholders.’25 Because shareholders’ claims are 
“unlimited on the upside and limited on the downside,” they prefer 
riskier strategies and higher dividends.26 Conversely, bondholders 
prefer a conservative business strategy; if the corporation retains its 
earnings, it increases the probability that it will have the funds to 
 
According to Warga’s and Welch’s studies, bond values declined by about 7% per year from 
1985 to 1988. Id. at n.22. Asquith’s and Wizman’s study showed that from 1980 to 1988 
bondholders whose bonds “were not protected by traditional bond covenants suffered 
abnormal returns of -5.3%.” Id. However, Kahan and Klausner cite earlier studies that found 
only minimal negative impact on bond values. Id. (citing Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, 
Leveraged Buyouts: Wealth Created or Wealth Redistributed, in PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD 
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 46 (Murray L. Weidenbaum & Kenneth W. Chilton eds., 1988); 
Laurentius Marais et al., Wealth Effects of Going Private for Senior Securities, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 
155 (1989)). 
 20. Id. at 943; see also Arlen & Talley, supra note 11 (“[T]o protect themselves from 
substantial potential costs associated with a change of control, third parties may reasonably 
insist on change of control provisions that give them the right to terminated the contract on 
favorable terms: terms that confer a benefit on the third party and a penalty on the contracting 
firm.”). 
 21. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 937–38. 
 22. See id. at 938. 
 23. Id. (“The starting point in analyzing the impact of any bond covenant on firm value 
is the agency cost framework developed by Jensen and Meckling.”). 
 24. Id. (“The agency cost of debt is a product of the conflicting interests of shareholders 
and bondholders once bonds have been issued.”). 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. 
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repay its debt.27 The result of these competing interests can 
incentivize a company to “engage in transactions that lower the 
value of the firm but nevertheless increase shareholder wealth by 
shifting wealth from bondholders to shareholders.”28 Such an 
instance would not additionally benefit bondholders if the company 
succeeded, but they would certainly suffer if the company failed. 
“The present value of the contingent losses in aggregate firm value 
attributable to such potential actions is referred to as an agency cost 
of debt.”29 Under the agency cost framework, the shareholders bear 
the agency cost of debt.30 
Because bondholders are aware that companies can engage in 
activities that will shift wealth to shareholders, they can demand 
higher interest rates as ex ante compensation.31 Consequently, 
shareholders, who bear the cost of the increased interest rate, can 
have an interest in reducing the agency cost of debt, even though 
doing so might deny them the option of taking a potential risk-
shifting action.32 Poison puts can therefore potentially increase share 
values—and the firm value as a whole—to the extent that they lower 
the interest rates on bonds and preclude wealth-reducing actions.33 
However, if the poison put protection is not reflected in the bond 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. Kahan and Klausner give an example of a company implementing a leveraged 
recapitalization in which it pays out a large dividend to shareholders by borrowing money. Id. 
Doing so would potentially decrease the value of the firm and could even lead the business to 
bankruptcy. Id. Despite the potential for overall loss to the firm, however, shareholders could 
gain from the transaction while, conversely, bondholders would lose. Id. at 938–39.  
 29. Id. at 939 (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 334–37 
(1976)). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. However, it is worth noting that the shareholder gains from acquisitions 
normally greatly exceed the losses to bondholders. Id. at 940 (citing Asquith & Wizman, supra 
note 19, at 212). 
 33. Id. 
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price,34 then bondholders benefit from a windfall at the shareholders’ 
expense.35 
Additionally, because the benefit to shareholders in takeovers is, 
on average, far greater than the loss to bondholders,36 takeovers can 
generally increase firm values.37 As a result, some scholars have 
concluded that bondholder protections cannot increase the 
aggregate value of a firm.38 While these arguments seem to weigh in 
favor of making a bright-line, per se rule against poison puts, the 
potential that a poison put brings for reducing the agency cost of 
debt, coupled with the chance that it could prevent wealth-reducing 
action, could theoretically justify a board’s decision to employ these 
provisions in a debt indenture as a rational business decision. 
Additionally, poison put provisions may increase firm value by 
enhancing efficiency with respect to wealth-increasing, takeover-
related activity.39 Although an acquisition can greatly increase firm 
value, it is possible that this increase is due to changes in 
management and operating efficiencies.40 In fact, the increased 
leverage might actually have a negative impact on the firm—e.g., 
from inefficient investment policies.41 Despite that potential negative 
impact, shareholders would likely support the increased leverage if it 
transferred wealth from the target firm’s bondholders to its 
shareholders.42 However, if a poison put provision ensures that 
bondholders be compensated for only their losses in a takeover 
 
 34. This would occur if the interest rates did not reflect the protection of the covenant. 
Id. at 939–40. In Amylin, the proxy put provision was not negotiated for, and its inclusion in 
the indenture was therefore not reflected in the price or interest rates of the bonds. See infra 
Parts IV–V. Thus, I argue that the bondholders would benefit from a windfall if the provisions 
were triggered, and the managers benefit from the entrenchment protection that they offer by 
deterring shareholders from voting in a way that would triggered.  
 35. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 939–40. 
 36. Id. at 940 (citing Asquith & Wizman, supra note 19, at 212). In Asquith and 
Wizman’s sample, taking into account bonds with and without traditional covenant protection, 
bondholder losses were merely roughly 3 percent of shareholder gains. Id. at n.24. 
 37. Id. at 941. 
 38. Id. (citing Kenneth Lehn & Annette Poulsen, The Economics of Event Risk: The Case 
of Bondholders in Leveraged Buyouts, 15 J. CORP. L. 199, 214 (1990)). However, Kahan and 
Klausner acknowledge the possibility that a share value increase could reflect inaccurate pricing 
that often occurs prior to takeovers. Id. at n.25 (citing generally Martin Lipton, Corporate 
Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1987)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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(instead of merely imposing a set price at which the bonds can be 
sold back), it encourages efficiency and eliminates the incentive to 
adopt an unnecessarily high degree of leverage—thereby increasing 
firm value.43  
Firms may also increase their value by attracting institutional 
investors that will only invest in low-risk bonds.44 Such investors 
would also find comfort in the assurance that they can avoid paying 
transaction costs of selling their bonds in an illiquid market.45 
Furthermore, during times of high takeover volume, when low-risk 
bonds are scarce, a change of control covenant can provide an option 
for investors.46 Therefore, a firm could potentially increase its value, 
and in turn benefit its shareholders, by issuing bonds with poison put 
provisions.47 
3. Managerial motivation for the board of directors 
Naturally, an increase in a firm’s value benefits its directors; if the 
company is doing well, the directors have greater job security. 
However, directors can use poison puts to benefit themselves in 
other ways. Because they have substantial control over the terms of 
poison put provisions, they can prevent control transactions that they 
oppose.48 Thus, by insulating themselves from hostile change, they 
can usurp shareholder power and actually reduce firm value. 
Just as shareholders’ and bondholders’ interests do not perfectly 
align, directors and shareholders can have conflicting interests.49 
Kahan and Klausner discuss directors’ parochial interests, which 
might be their true motivation to institute poison put provisions.50 
When directors take actions, in pursuit of their personal interests, 
that are not in the shareholders’ best interest, the resulting losses are 
 
 43. Id. “[Poison puts] may be especially effective in deterring inefficient leveraged 
recapitalizations.” Id. at 942. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 942–43. 
 46. Id. at 943. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.; see also Arlen & Talley, supra note 11, at 620 (explaining how managers can use 
poison put type provisions to significantly increase the cost of acquisitions, insulating 
themselves at the shareholders’ expense). 
 49. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 944. Directors are concerned with 
“compensation, work conditions, job security, reputation, and power,” while shareholders are 
primarily interested in the maximization of share values. Id. 
 50. See id. 
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termed the agency cost of equity.51 Shareholder action in the market 
for corporate control—e.g., through hostile takeovers and proxy 
contests—can be an important mechanism for reducing the agency 
cost of equity.52 Not only can hostile takeovers and proxy contests 
remove failing directors and replace them with more effective 
counterparts, but the mere threat of those actions also incentivizes 
directors to work for the shareholders’ interests.53 Thus, to the 
extent that hostile control changes promote efficient management 
and move corporate assets to their highest value uses, they increase 
the firm’s value.54 Conversely, when defense mechanisms like poison 
puts insulate directors from the corporate control market, the agency 
cost of equity may rise and thereby potentially decrease the value of 
the firm.55 
In many instances the cost imposed by poison puts is nominal in 
comparison to the gains of an acquisition.56 If a poison put only calls 
for compensation to bondholders for their takeover related losses, it 
may not be much of a deterrent to takeover-related events and 
therefore not significantly affect the agency cost of equity.57 Such 
provisions could thus lower bondholder risk without harming 
shareholders if the bondholder benefit is reflected in the price or 
interest rates of the bonds. Directorial decision to include such a 
 
 51. Id. (citing Jensen & Meckling, supra note 29, at 327–28). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169–74 (1981); 
Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in 
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841–45 (1981); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the 
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965)). But see Lynn A. Stout, The 
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789 (2007) (arguing that director 
accountability to shareholders may increase agency costs). In addition, Kahan and Klausner 
cited to Lipton, supra note 38, at 20–25, as an example of an argument that “takeover threat 
induces undesirable responses.” Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 944 n.38. 
 55. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 944. However, Kahan and Klausner 
acknowledge that “some antitakeover devices allow management to protect shareholders from 
underpriced or coercive tender offers, or help create an auction among potential acquirors that 
may increase the price received by target shareholders.” Id. at n.40 (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk, 
The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1054–56 (1982); 
Lipton, supra note 38, at 26). However, they also refer again to Easterbrook & Fischel, supra 
note 54, which argues that “such tactics are not in the ex ante interest of shareholders or 
society.” Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 944 n.40. 
 56. Id. at 945; see supra text accompanying notes 36–38. 
 57. Id. 
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provision could then conceivably be protected by the business 
judgment rule.58 However, in other provisions, the triggered remedy 
can exceed the loss suffered by bondholders.59 This is particularly 
true in the case of proxy puts, which highlights why proxy puts are a 
more troublesome entrenchment mechanism and the decision to 
implement them in an indenture should be subjected to heightened 
scrutiny. 
Proxy puts are more troublesome than other poison puts for two 
reasons. First, shareholders’ gains in proxy contests are far less than 
their gains in hostile takeovers.60 Therefore, even if the triggered 
remedy is modest, it can have significant deterrent effect in 
preventing shareholders from voting against incumbent 
management.61 Second, in a change of control through proxy 
election, bond values are likely to be unaffected.62 Because proxy 
elections do not directly increase the leverage of the firm or affect 
the bond’s credit rating—and thereby increase the agency cost of 
debt—preventing them will not decrease the agency cost of debt. 
Hence, allowing bondholders to sell back their notes at par value has 
catastrophic potential, which would have been the case in Amylin. 
Market changes can greatly decrease the value of bonds (while the 
actual change of control does not affect them), and so when a put is 
triggered after market conditions have lowered the value of a bond, 
paying the bondholders could bankrupt the firm. Because 
shareholders would naturally want to avoid this outcome, the 
entrenchment effect of the puts greatly increases the agency cost of 
equity. 
Moreover, managers’ substantial control over the terms of 
poison put provisions enables them to omit management buyouts 
and other friendly acquisitions from the covenant while including 
 
 58. While this is certainly a logical possibility, this Note does not attempt to make a 
detailed, bright-line rule for when the decision to employ poison put provisions should be 
protected by the business judgment rule. Rather, this Note focuses on defining a rule for proxy 
puts specifically. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 946 (citing Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On Corporate Governance: A 
Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 401 (1983)). 
 61. Id. (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal 
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1091–93 (1990)). Kahan and Klausner 
refer to the Bebchuk and Kahan’s point that the “reduced likelihood of winning decreases 
incentives by potential challengers to initiate a proxy contest.” Id. at n.48. 
 62. See id. at 945–46. 
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hostile takeovers and proxy elections.63 In entering debt indentures, 
managers are not required to obtain shareholder approval, and the 
complexity of the provisions make it easy for directors to design 
them in a self-serving manner without shareholder review.64 Hence, 
management can provide incomplete bondholder protection in a way 
that increases the agency cost of equity and has no effect on 
bondholder interests.65 If a poison put type covenant were to offer 
full protection to a bondholder, it would grant full compensation for 
any loss that bondholders incur from acquisitions generally—hostile 
or friendly—and it could thereby decrease the agency cost of debt.66 
However, directors’ primary concern with control changes stems 
from the threat of the loss of employment in hostile changes, which 
management usually protects against when writing poison put 
provisions.67 
Management protects itself against hostile changes in three main 
ways. First, directors can restrict a poison put’s coverage to 
transactions that they disfavor (leaving bondholders at risk for 
director favored acquisitions).68 Consequently, this could lower the 
firm value by achieving only a nominal reduction of the agency cost 
of debt, while at the same time creating an uneven playing field for 
hostile acquirers and increasing the agency cost of equity.69 Second, 
directors can design a provision that increases the costs of control 
changes that threaten their job security but do not threaten the 
bondholders.70 This category seems to encompass proxy puts and 
would also include non-leveraged hostile acquisitions.71 These 
provisions would increase the firm’s agency cost of equity.72 Finally, a 
 
 63. Id. at 947. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 948. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 949. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. Because friendly bidders would not face the hurdle of the put provision, they 
would be at an incredible advantage over hostile bidders, who would have to deal with the 
increased costs associated with triggering the put. See id. at 947. 
 70. See id. at 949. 
 71. See id. at 949–50. Kahan and Klausner also considered that bondholders may 
actually favor proxy contests and non-leveraged hostile acquisitions because new management 
could increase performance without increasing bondholder risk. Id. at n.57. In such a case, 
there would be no sense in awarding any compensation to the bondholders after the 
transaction. 
 72. Id. at 950. 
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third category includes poison puts that provide for a supra-
compensatory remedy to bondholders in the event that unwanted 
acquisitions occurred.73 This increases the company’s agency cost of 
equity without a reduction in its agency cost of debt.74 Proxy puts 
may also fall into this category because of their potential to 
compensate far in excess of bondholder loss. 
The effects poison puts have on the agency cost of debt and 
equity should have great bearing on their legality. Using these effects 
to draw a definitive line is difficult, but the ideal “bondholder-
protective covenants”—in which all leveraged acquisitions and 
recapitalizations are covered and bondholders are only compensated 
for the actual decrease in bond values resulting from the 
transactions75—should be legal, and their use should be within 
directorial discretion. Such transactions can minimize the agency cost 
of debt and equity, and a board’s decision to employ them could 
therefore reasonably be within the protection of the business 
judgment rule.76 Such a provision should probably not be the limit 
for legal poison put provisions. There is probably room for 
directorial discretion beyond that, and while this Note does not 
attempt to define the boundaries, it does contend that proxy puts 
should be beyond them. They constitute a form of the “ideal 
management protective covenant” that Kahan and Klausner 
describe.77 They are triggered by proxy challenges and provide for a 
supra-compensatory remedy, increasing the firm’s agency cost of 
equity without reducing the agency cost of debt. 
III. LEGAL STANDARDS 
Since the mid ’80s, the Delaware courts have presided over many 
influential cases that now govern Delaware law in hostile takeover 
contexts. Before 1985, the courts merely applied the business 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id.  
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. (“The ideal management-protective covenant, in contrast, would cover only 
hostile acquisitions and proxy challenges, and it would provide a supra-compensatory remedy 
in the event that either of these control changes occurs. This covenant would both increase the 
firm’s agency cost of equity and fail to achieve potential reductions in the agency cost of 
debt.”). 
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judgment rule to director conduct even in defense of hostile 
takeovers.78  
Under this deferential standard, hope was bleak for challenging 
directorial defensive measures. Once directors were under that 
protection, shareholders would have to show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the “directors’ [defensive actions] were primarily 
based on perpetuating themselves in office, or some other breach of 
duty such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being 
uninformed . . . .”79 
In 1985, however, the Delaware Supreme Court applied an 
innovative and aggressive new standard for reviewing board defensive 
action against hostile offers. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 
introduced a new, “intermediate” standard of review,80 which—
although it perhaps has not been the innovative change that it was 
originally anticipated to be81—has led to interesting and controversial 
judicial decisions and scholarly works. 
A. The Unocal Test: “Intermediate” Scrutiny for Hostile Takeovers 
In Unocal, Mesa, Inc., (a 13 percent Unocal shareholder) 
commenced a two-tier “front loaded” tender offer for 37 percent of 
Unocal’s shares in an effort to gain majority control of the 
company.82 The Unocal board rejected the offer and, to defend 
against it, instituted a self-tender offer (a form of “poison pill”).83 
According to the terms of the self-tender, if Mesa acquired its 
intended shares then Unocal would buy the remaining 49 percent of 
 
 78. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) 
(explaining that “the business judgment rule, including the standards by which director 
conduct is judged, [was] applicable in the context of a takeover” (citing Pogostin v. Rice, 480 
A.2d 691, 627 (Del. 1984))). In Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), the Delaware 
Supreme Court defined the business judgment rule as a “presumption that in making a 
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and 
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Id. at 812. 
 79. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958. 
 80. Thompson & Smith, supra note 11, at 281. 
 81. See id. at 293. “Regardless of one’s predilections about the initial decision, however, 
the subsequent development of the Unocal standard has failed to live up to its early billing.” 
Id. Included in the initial fanfare was Chancellor Allen, calling it “the most innovative and 
promising case in our recent corporation law.” Id. (citing City Capital Assocs., L.P. v. Interco, 
Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1988)). 
 82. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949. 
 83. Id. at 951.  
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the outstanding shares—excluding Mesa from the proposal.84 Mesa 
sued the Unocal Board in the Court of Chancery and won.85 
When the case reached the Delaware Supreme Court on appeal, 
however, the court was prepared to establish a new standard for 
takeover situations. The issue on appeal was whether the Unocal 
board had “the power and duty to oppose a takeover threat [that] it 
reasonably perceived to be harmful to the corporate enterprise, and if 
so, [was] its action here entitled to the protection of the business 
judgment rule?”86 
In its analysis, the court opined that “[b]ecause of the 
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own 
interests [in takeover situations], rather than those of the corporation 
and its shareholders,” the board is subject to an “enhanced duty.”87 
This “enhanced duty” requires directors to meet a two-part test 
before they can receive the benefit of the business judgment rule. 
First, directors must demonstrate that they did not act “solely or 
primarily out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in office;” they 
must have reasonably perceived a threat to the company.88 Second, 
they must show that their actions were proportional, or “reasonable 
in relation to the threat posed.”89 Interestingly, despite the 
heightened scrutiny, the court determined that the directors in 
Unocal satisfied the two-part test and were, therefore, entitled to the 
protection of the business judgment rule.90 
B. Liquid Audio and Blasius: A Compelling Justification Standard 
Chancellor Allen of the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed 
directorial defensive tactics in a somewhat different vein than Unocal 
in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.91 In Blasius, the plaintiff—a 
9% shareholder of Atlas, Corp.—challenged the Atlas directors’ 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 951–52. 
 86. Id. at 953 (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. at 954. 
 88. Id. at 955 (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964); Kors v. Carey, 
158 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. Ch. 1960)). With this prong, the court required that defense 
measures be motivated by a good faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its 
stockholders—i.e., not entrenchment. Id. (citing Cheff, 199 A.2d at 554–55). 
 89. Id. at 955. This prong requires directors to analyze “the nature of the takeover bid 
and its effect on the corporate enterprise.” Id.  
 90. Id. at 956–58.  
 91. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
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action to add two new members to its seven member board.92 The 
addition was controversial because the board’s motivation was to 
preclude Atlas’s shareholders from electing a majority of new 
directors through the plaintiff’s consent solicitation.93 The issue then 
facing Chancellor Allen was whether a board can act “consistently 
with its fiduciary duty when it acts, in good faith and with 
appropriate care, for the primary purpose of preventing or impeding 
an unaffiliated majority of shareholders from expanding the board 
and electing a new majority.”94 
The interesting aspect of the case was that Chancellor Allen 
determined that, in adding the board members, the directors “acted 
on their view of the corporation’s interest and not selfishly,”95 and, 
therefore, apparently under the protection of the business judgment 
rule. However, the Chancellor qualified the question posed as not 
one of fiduciary duty, but one of authority “as between the fiduciary 
and the beneficiary.”96 In Allen’s eyes, this question of authority 
distinguished acts that interfere with the effectiveness of stockholder 
voting from other Unocal type claims.97 He reasoned that the 
“central importance of the [shareholder] franchise to the scheme of 
corporate governance, requires that, in this setting, [the Unocal 
intermediate scrutiny] rule not be applied and that closer scrutiny be 
accorded.”98 
In reaching that conclusion, Chancellor Allen reasoned, in 
language now famous in corporate law, that “[t]he shareholder 
franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy 
of directorial power rests.”99 He elaborated that the only two 
protections afforded shareholders against inadequate board business 
performance are selling their stock and voting to replace board 
members.100 The chancellor opined: 
[W]hether the vote is seen functionally as an unimportant 
formalism, or as an important tool of discipline, it is clear that it is 
 
 92. Id. at 652.  
 93. Id. at 655. 
 94. Id. at 652. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 658. 
 97. Id. at 659. 
 98. Id. (emphasis added). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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critical to the theory that legitimates the exercise of power by some 
(directors and officers) over vast aggregations of property that they 
do not own. Thus . . . matters involving the integrity of the 
shareholder voting process involve consideration not present in any 
other context in which directors exercise delegated power.101 
In sum, infringing on the shareholder franchise’s right to vote would 
be an inappropriate usurpation of shareholder authority by the board 
of directors. 
Chancellor Allen further reasoned that the ordinary 
considerations that implicated the business judgment rule were not 
involved in the shareholder voting context.102 He argued that rather 
than exercising the corporation’s power over its property, or 
respecting its rights, every time “an incumbent board seeks to thwart 
a shareholder majority” it will involve the question of who has 
authority regarding a matter of internal corporate governance.103 In 
such a situation, a court may not leave to the “agent finally to decide 
so long as he does so honestly and competently”; therefore, the 
business judgment rule cannot apply.104 Although the corporate law 
theory gives directors power as agents of the shareholders, “it does 
not create Platonic masters.”105 Instead of the deferential business 
judgment rule, in a Blasius-type case the board of directors must 
“bear[] the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification 
for such action.”106 
The Blasius case did not reach the Delaware Supreme Court on 
appeal, but its holding was adopted by the court in a later case, MM 
Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.107 In Liquid Audio, the 
plaintiff shareholders (“MM”) sued for injunctive relief against the 
Liquid Audio board’s action to expand its board members from five 
to seven.108 The board enacted this expansion after MM had 
nominated two directors for an upcoming election to Liquid Audio’s 
staggered board.109 The court, in an opinion written by Justice 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 660. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 663. 
 106. Id. at 661. 
 107. 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003). 
 108. Id. at 1121. 
 109. Id. at 1123. 
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Holland, found that the board had taken this action “for the primary 
purpose of interfering with and impeding the effectiveness of the 
shareholder franchise in electing successor directors.”110 Justice 
Holland concluded that the board’s actions implicated the Blasius 
compelling justification standard within the Unocal test.111 The 
Holland court held that: 
When the primary purpose of a board of directors’ defensive 
measure is to interfere with or impede the effective exercise of the 
shareholder franchise in a contested election for directors, the 
board must first demonstrate a compelling justification for such 
action as a condition precedent to any judicial consideration of 
reasonableness and proportionately.112  
In sum, the court fully adopted and integrated the Blasius 
compelling justification standard into the Unocal test as a condition 
precedent to the reasonableness and proportionality prong. 
 
 
 110. Id. at 1131. The board members testified that they were concerned that the two of 
the incumbent directors may resign if MM’s nominees were elected, due to the “acrimonious 
relationship between MM and Liquid Audio.” Id. at 1126. Because they felt that if either one 
or two of the incumbent directors resigned it could jeopardize an impending merger that the 
incumbent directors favored and “run an undue risk to the shareholders,” they acted to 
“minimize the impact of the election of MM’s nominees.” Id. at 1125–26. 
 111. Id. at 1131 (“This case presents a paragon of when the compelling justification 
standard of Blasius must be applied within Unocal’s requirement that any defensive measure be 
proportionate and reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”). Earlier in the opinion, Justice 
Holland recounted that both the supreme court and the chancery court had recognized the 
“substantial degree of congruence” between the rationale for the heightened Blasius standard 
and the “logical extension of that rationale within the context of the Unocal enhanced 
standard of judicial review.” Id. at 1129 (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 91 (Del. 1992); 
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 320 (Del. CH. 2000)). He summarized Gilbert v. 
El Paso Co. as holding that the Unocal standard must be applied “whenever a board . . . adopts 
any defensive measure ‘in response to some threat to corporate policy and effectiveness which 
touches upon issues of control.’” Id. (quoting 575 A.2d 1131, 1144 (Del. 1990)). He then 
interpreted Stroud to show how the Blasius compelling justification standard fit into Unocal: 
“A board’s unilateral decision to adopt a defensive measure touching upon ‘issues of control’ 
that purposefully disenfranchises its shareholders is strongly suspect under Unocal, and cannot 
be sustained without a ‘compelling justification.’” Id. at 1130 (quoting Stroud, 606 A.2d at 92 
n.3). 
 112. Id. at 1132. Important to note in the holding is that the defensive actions taken by 
the board do not actually need to succeed in preventing the shareholders from gaining a seat 
on the board, and the contested election does not need to involve an competition for outright 
control of the board. Id. All that is required is that the board’s defensive actions were taken 
with the primary purpose of “interfering with or impeding the effectiveness of the stockholder 
vote.” Id. 
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IV. SAN ANTONIO FIRE & POLICE PENSION FUND V. AMYLIN 
PHARMACEUTICALS 
The legality of two poison put provisions was at the heart of San 
Antonio Fire and Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals.113 
In Amylin, San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund (the “Pension 
Fund”) sued Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., (“Amylin”) and its board 
members to enable the board to disable the change of control 
provisions in both a bond indenture for notes and a credit agreement 
for a senior secured credit facility114—both proxy puts. 
A. Facts of the Case 
In 2007, the Amylin board’s Finance Committee approved the 
issuance of 3.00% convertible senior notes (“2007 Notes”).115 The 
indenture for the 2007 Notes (“Indenture”) contained a change of 
control covenant that is the central piece to this lawsuit.116 The 
change of control provision is in § 11.01 of the Indenture and “gives 
the noteholders the right to demand redemption of any or all of 
their notes at face value upon the occurrence of certain events, 
including a Fundamental Change, as defined in the Indenture.”117 
The Indenture provides that a “Fundamental Change” occurs if, “at 
any time the Continuing Directors do not constitute a majority of 
the Company’s Board of Directors,” defining “Continuing 
Directors” as: 
(i) individuals who on the Issue Date constituted the Board of 
Directors and (ii) any new directors whose election to the Board of 
Directors or whose nomination for election by the stockholders of 
the Company was approved by at least a majority of the directors 
then still in office (or a duly constituted committee thereof) either 
 
 113. 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009). 
 114. San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc., C.A. No. 
4446-VCL at 2–3 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2009), available at http://law.du.edu/ 
documents/corporate-governance/governance-cases/Antonio-Fire-Police-Memorandum-Opi 
nion.pdf. 
 115. Id. In May 2007, the board had adopted resolutions that authorized certain 
members of senior management to negotiate the terms and conditions of the 2007 Notes. Id. 
at 2. The board also made the Finance Committee the “Pricing Committee” for the notes, 
giving them full board authority to negotiate and issue the notes. It was the Pricing 
Committee that ultimately approved the notes’ issuance. Id. 
 116. Id. at 3–4. 
 117. Id. (citing Fourth Am. Compl. Ex. A § 11.01). 
DO NOT DELETE 4/16/2010  3:58 PM 
767 A Critical Analysis of the Legality of Poison Puts 
 785 
who were directors on the Issue Date or whose election or 
nomination for election was previously so approved.118 
Although the Pricing Committee had extensive discussions about 
various terms of the notes before authorizing their issuance, the 
proxy put was never brought to the attention of the board of 
directors.119 
In addition to the provision in the Indenture, this case also 
involved a proxy put in Amylin’s senior secured credit facility (the 
“Credit Agreement”), which Amylin entered into with Bank of 
America, N.A., (“BANA”) shortly after issuing the 2007 Notes.120 
The proxy put in the Credit Agreement was more explicitly 
confining that the provision in the Indenture, as it accelerated the 
debt due under the agreement if a Change of Control occurred.121 
Although counsel for Amylin tried to define a Change of Control 
 
 118. Id. at 4 (quoting Fourth Am. Compl. Ex. A § 1.01). At all times relevant to this 
case, and at the time this case was tried, the Amylin board consisted of twelve Continuing 
Directors. Id. 
 119. See id. at 4–5. The drafting history reveals that the originally circulated drafts of the 
description of the 2007 Notes and the of the Indenture contained the Continuing Directors 
provision. Id. Prior to issuing the notes, the Pricing Committee worked extensively with its 
management, legal advisors, and underwriters to structure them, after which it consulted 
outside counsel on various terms. Id. at 4. During that process, the proxy put provision was 
not brought up, even after the directors asked counsel if there was anything “unusual or not 
customary” in the Indenture. Id. (citing Bradbury Dep. Tr. 77). 
 120. Id. at 5–6. Although Amylin entered into the Credit Agreement after it issued the 
2007 Notes, the Finance Committee authorized Amylin officers to enter the agreement almost 
one year prior to the notes’ issuance. Id. at 5. 
 121. Id. at 6. A Change of control in the Credit agreement is defined as including: 
an event or series of events by which . . . (b) during any period of 24 consecutive 
months, a majority of the members of the board of directors or other equivalent 
governing body of the Company cease to be composed of individuals 
  (i) who were members of that board or equivalent governing body on the first 
day of such period, 
  (ii) whose election or nomination to that board or equivalent governing body 
was approved by individuals referred to in clause (i) above constituting at the time of 
such election or nomination at least a majority of that board or equivalent governing 
body, or  
  (iii) whose election or nomination to that board or other equivalent governing 
body was approved by individuals referred to in clauses (i) and (ii) above 
constituting at the time of such election or nomination at least a majority of that 
board or equivalent governing body (excluding, in the case of both clause (ii) and 
clause (iii), any individual whose initial nomination for, or assumption of office as, a 
member of that board or equivalent governing body occurs as a result of an actual 
or threatened solicitation of proxies or consents for the election or removal of one 
or more directors by any person or group other than a solicitation for the election of 
one or more directors by or on behalf of the board of directors). 
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using the same language as the Indenture, BANA’s counsel insisted 
on the version that ended up in the agreement.122 
The proxy puts became relevant when, on consecutive days, two 
stockholders independently notified Amylin of their intention to 
each nominate a slate of five directors to the twelve-person Amylin 
board.123 First, Icahn Partners LP (“Icahn”), an approximately 8.8% 
stockholder, notified Amylin, and the following day, Eastbourne 
Capital Management, LLC (“Eastbourne”), a 12.5% stockholder, 
followed suit.124 While neither stockholder’s nominated slate would 
change a majority of the board alone, if both succeeded without the 
board’s approval, the proxy puts would be triggered.  
A few days later, Eastbourne sent a letter to Amylin asking for 
the board to take the necessary action to prevent the Continuing 
Directors provision from being triggered.125 However, Eastbourne 
requested that the board assemble an approved combination of 
directors that included a large number from each of Icahn’s and 
Eastbourne’s nominees.126 
Amylin responded to the dissident slates in its 10K filing—
explaining the proxy put provisions and highlighting the potential 
adverse consequences the company would face if they were 
triggered.127 Just over one week later, Eastbourne mailed a letter to 
the board in which it questioned the legitimacy of the proxy put 
provisions.128 Eastbourne encouraged the board to still “approve” 
the dissident slates, but to do anything necessary to remove any 
obstacles to the stockholder franchise.129 
B. Litigation 
The Pension Fund filed suit against Amylin and its individual 
directors on March 24, 2009. In its original suit, the Pension Fund 
requested declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging three claims of 
breach of fiduciary duties: 
 
 122. Id. at 7. 
 123. Id. at 4, 7. 
 124. Id. at 7. 
 125. Id. at 7–8. 
 126. Id. at 8. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 8–9. 
 129. Id. 
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(1) [B]reaches of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by the 
board of Amylin in the adoption of the Credit Agreement and the 
Indenture, insofar as they both contained Continuing Directors 
provisions, (2) breaches of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty 
by Amylin’s board in failing to approve the dissident nominees in 
order to defuse the Continuing Directors provision of the 
Indenture, and (3) breaches of the fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty in the allegedly misleading and coercive manner in which 
Amylin’s board chose to disclose the risks presented by the 
Continuing Directors provisions in the company’s Form 10-K.130 
Additionally, Eastbourne requested a mandatory injunction forcing 
the directors to approve the shareholders’ nominees.131 Shortly after 
the Pension Fund filed suit, Amylin filed its preliminary proxy 
statement, followed by a proxy “fight letter” stating: 
While we believe that the Board has the ability to approve any 
nominees proposed by Icahn or Eastbourne at any time up to the 
election in order to nullify the debt acceleration provision, we 
cannot ensure that our bondholders will concur with that view. In 
fact, we requested confirmation of our view from the trustee of the 
[2007] notes and the trustee has refused to confirm our view. To 
protect the company and its shareholders, this issue will need to be 
resolved in court.132 
Subsequent to the “fight letter,” the Pension Fund filed two 
amended complaints, adding BANA and the trustee of the 2007 
Notes (the “Trustee”) as defendants and seeking declaratory relief 
establishing the board’s sole right and power to “approve” 
stockholder nominees.133 After Amylin and its directors filed an 
answer,134 the Pension Fund moved for partial summary judgment 
that the Credit Agreement’s proxy put was unenforceable as a matter 
of law.135 Further, the Pension Fund moved for summary judgment 
giving the board “the right and power to approve the stockholder 
nominees for the purpose of the Indenture.”136 
 
 130. Id. at 9. 
 131. Id. at 9–10.  
 132. Id. at 10. 
 133. Id. at 10–11. 
 134. The answer also contained a cross-claim by Amylin against the Trustee. Id. at 11. 
The claim against the Trustee sought declaratory relief that the board had the right to approve 
the election of any of the dissident nominees at any time prior to the election. Id.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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C. The Pension Fund and Amylin Reach a Partial Settlement 
About three weeks after the Pension Fund filed its complaint, 
Amylin and the Pension Fund announced that they had reached a 
partial settlement.137 The board released a public statement 
summarizing the terms: 
[T]he Board has determined, subject only to the entry of a final, 
non-appealable order prior to May 27, 2009 declaring that the 
Board possesses the contractual right to do so, that the Board will 
“approve” the Icahn Capital LP and Eastbourne Capital 
management L.L.C. nominees for [the purpose of the Continuing 
Directors provision of the Indenture].138  
In return for that released statement, the Pension fund agreed to 
drop its loyalty claim, to refrain from seeking damages against 
Amylin or the board, dismiss its claim of coercive disclosure in the 
Form 10-K without prejudice, and dismiss the fiduciary duty claim 
for the board’s failure to approve the stockholder nominees.139 
Following the settlement, Amylin moved for partial summary 
judgment for its cross-claim against the Trustee.140 
After the settlement, Amylin and BANA entered into a consent 
waiver agreement that waived any event of default that would result 
if the Credit Agreement’s proxy put was triggered.141 The court was 
therefore satisfied that the claims against BANA were moot, but 
determined that the resolution of the BANA claims did not affect the 
claims concerning the Indenture.142 Soon after the BANA claims 
were resolved, Eastbourne and Icahn both reduced the number of 
their nominees in their definitive proxy statements—Eastbourne 
from five to three, and Icahn from five to two.143 Consequently, the 
Trustee argued that the issue was not ripe because there was no 
longer potential for a change in the majority of the board.144 
However, both the Pension Fund and Amylin contended that even if 
only five nominees were elected whether or not they were 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 12. 
 139. Id. at 11–12. 
 140. Id. at 12. 
 141. Id. at 13. 
 142. Id. at 12–13. 
 143. Id. at 14. 
 144. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/16/2010  3:58 PM 
767 A Critical Analysis of the Legality of Poison Puts 
 789 
Continuing Directors would be critical in the following year’s 
stockholder meeting.145 
D. The Court’s Analysis 
The court first addressed “whether or not the . . . board [had] 
both the power and the right under the Indenture to approve the 
stockholder nominees.”146 Considering the matter one of contract 
interpretation, the court first looked to the language of the 
Indenture.147 The language was not clearly unambiguous as both 
parties argued for differing meanings of the word “approve.”148  
First, the Trustee argued that “approve” should be interpreted as 
synonymous with “endorse or recommend.”149 The court took issue 
with this argument because, under the Trustee’s logic, the board 
would never be able to approve a shareholder-nominated slate of 
directors—for the purposes of the Indenture—while, simultaneously, 
endorsing its own slate.150 Conversely, Amylin argued that the court 
should adopt the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “approve”: 
“‘to approve’ means ‘to give formal sanction to; to confirm 
authoritatively.’”151 According to that definition, “while 
endorsement or recommendation may necessarily imply approval, the 
reverse is not true.”152 Thus, the board could sanction the 
nomination of a dissident slate without endorsing its candidacy, and, 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 15. At this point, the Amylin board had already agreed that it would approve 
the insurgent parties’ nominees if the court determined that it had the power. Id. 
 147. Id. at 17. “Indentures are to be read strictly and to the extent they do not expressly 
restrict the rights of the issuer, the issuer is left with the freedom to act, subject only to the 
boundaries of other positive law.” Id. (citing In re Loral Space & Commc’ns, Inc. Consol. 
Litig., 2008 WL 4293781, at *35 (Del. Ch.)). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. The Board recounted the Trustee’s argument: 
[t]he Board’s determination not to recommend the election of any of the Dissident 
Nominees, to recommend its own competing slate, and that the election of the 
Dissident Nominees would not be in the best interests of the Company—
determinations that have not changed as a result of the Partial Settlement—simply 
cannot be reconciled with the plain meaning of the term “approval.” To the 
contrary, such determinations by the Board clearly indicate disapproval.  
Id. (citing Trustee’s Br. In Opp’n to Pl.’s and Amylin’s Mot. for Summ. J. 31–32 (emphasis in 
original)). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 111 (8th ed. 2004)). 
 152. Id. at 17–18. 
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meanwhile, still recommend and support its own slate of 
nominees.153 The court agreed with Amylin, cautioning that a 
provision incorporating the Trustee’s proposed meaning, with “such 
an eviscerating effect on the stockholder franchise[,] would raise 
grave concerns.”154  
Although the court determined that the board had the power to 
approve the nominees, the question remained as to their right of 
approval. Did the board properly exercise that right in this case? The 
court articulated the issue, “[t]he key question is whether approval 
by the board, under the given circumstances, comports with the 
company’s implied duty of good faith and fair dealing which inheres 
in all contracts, including the Indenture.”155 The court looked to the 
rule from Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic,156 which allows the board to 
approve stockholder nominees if it determines in good faith that the 
election of at least one of the dissident nominees would “not be 
materially adverse to the interests of the corporation or its 
stockholders.”157 While the court identified the appropriate rule for 
the instant case, it found the application of that rule to be 
problematic.158 
The court concluded that there was not sufficient evidence 
before it to apply the Hill Stores test.159 Although the court 
acknowledged that two “sets of circumstances” cast some light onto 
the board’s decision-making process, it disregarded them as “less 
than helpful.”160 First, the court recognized that the board’s proxy 
fight letters potentially demonstrated that the board’s actions failed 
the Hill Stores test.161 Yet, the court dismissed the fight letters as 
mere “election puffery,” insufficient to show the board’s true 
 
 153. Id. at 18. 
 154. Id. at 19. The court reasoned that Trustee’s reading was far too restrictive, 
essentially making the provision an entrenchment mechanism. Id. at 18. More specifically, the 
Indenture would prohibit any change whatsoever in the board’s majority as a result of 
contested elections, throughout the lifetime of the note. Id. at 18–19. Were such a meaning 
incorporated, the court would require that the board demonstrate that it at least had a good 
faith belief that it was “obtaining in return extraordinarily valuable economic benefits for the 
corporation that would not otherwise be available to it.” Id.  
 155. Id. at 19–20. 
 156. 769 A.2d 88 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 157. Amylin, C.A. No. 4446-VCL at 21. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 21–22. 
 160. Id. at 22. 
 161. Id. at 22–23. 
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deliberations.162 Second, the court conceded that “the posture in 
which the board appears to have made its decision to approve” also 
was problematic.163 Namely, the board waited more than one month 
after the insurgent stockholders nominated the dissident slate to 
approve them, and when it did approve them, it was as part of its 
partial settlement with the Pension Fund.164 However, the court 
concluded that while these “circumstances at least raise[d] a question 
whether the board’s decision to approve was made in a good faith 
exercise of its considered business judgment,” the “underdeveloped 
state of the record” coupled with the post-trial developments—i.e., 
the dissident slates decreasing from ten nominees to five—
demonstrated that the issue was not yet ripe and should be 
relitigated in the future, if necessary.165 
Finally, the court considered the Pension Fund’s claim that the 
Amylin board breached its duty of care by adopting the Indenture in 
the first place, in light of the proxy put provision.166 The Pension 
Fund’s main assertion was that the Pricing Committee breached its 
duty of care by failing to discover the proxy put during its approval 
process for the Indenture.167 However, because it was a care claim, 
the court concluded that the board was entitled to the deferential 
treatment of the business judgment rule.168 The court reasoned that 
the board’s failure to ascertain and reject the presence of this 
provision was not “the sort of conduct generally imagined when 
considering the concept of gross negligence, typically defined as a 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 23. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 23–24. 
 166. Id. at 25–26. 
 167. Id. at 25. The Pension fund further argued that Amylin’s CEO and CFO both 
admitted that they were entirely unaware of the existence of the proxy put provisions until they 
read about them once the proxy contest began. Id. The court dismissed this information as 
unhelpful to the Pension Fund’s claim, because the CFO was not a director and there was no 
evidence that the CEO was on the Pricing Committee. Id. 
 168. See id. at 25. The court reasoned that the duty of care requires that 
in making business decisions, directors must consider all material information 
reasonably available, and that the directors’ process is actionable only if grossly 
negligent . . . . [T]he standard for judging the informational component of the 
directors’ decionmaking does not mean that the Board must be informed of every 
fact. The Board is responsible for considering only material facts that are reasonably 
available, not those that are immaterial or out of the Board’s reasonable reach. 
Id. at 25 (citing Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000)). 
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substantial deviation from the standard of care.”169 Because “the 
board retained highly-qualified counsel . . . , sought advice from [its] 
management and investment bankers as to the terms of the 
agreement . . . , [and] asked its counsel if there was anything 
‘unusual or not customary’ in the terms of the Notes,” the court was 
satisfied that the board did not act grossly negligent and held in 
favor of the defendants.170 
Nevertheless, in dicta, the court recognized that “[t]his case does 
highlight the troubling reality that corporations and their counsel 
routinely negotiate contract terms that may, in some circumstances, 
impinge on the free exercise of the stockholder franchise.”171 The 
court gave two reasons why this is particularly troubling when 
negotiating a debt instrument.172 First, few events “have the 
potential to be more catastrophic for a corporation than the 
triggering of an event of default under one of its debt 
agreements.”173 Second, when the board is negotiating these 
instruments, it is dealing “with rights that belong first and foremost 
to the stockholders (i.e., the stockholder franchise),” and it “must be 
especially solicitous to its duties both to the corporation and to its 
stockholders.”174 The truth of this notion is particularly relevant 
concerning transactions with debtholders—whose interests “may be 
directly adverse to those of the stockholders.”175 Particularly, terms 
that may limit the stockholders’ discretionary range in exercising the 
franchise should be highlighted to the board, thereby enabling the 
board “to exercise its fully informed business judgment.”176 
Ironically, though the court’s holding grants the directors the 
benefit of the business judgment rule, the court’s cautionary dicta 
recounts some of the key public policy reasons for not immediately 
granting directors that privilege in the case of proxy puts and why, 
instead, the directors should be subject to the Blasius standard of 
showing a compelling justification.  
 
 169. Id. at 26. 
 170. Id. The court reasoned that “[c]ertainly, no one suggests that the directors’ duty of 
care required them to review, discuss, and comprehend every word of the 98-page Indenture.” 
Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 27. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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E. Appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court 
The case reached the Delaware Supreme Court on appeal of 
several issues.177 The Pension Fund appealed the Court of Chancery’s 
decisions to refrain from validating the directors’ approval of the 
stockholder slates, not invalidate the proxy put in the Credit 
Agreement, and dismiss the care claim.178 However, five days after 
the arguments concluded, the court adopted the Chancery Court’s 
opinion and surmised its decision in one sentence and one footnote. 
The opinion, in its entirety stated:  
This 5th day of October 2009, upon consideration of the briefs of 
the parties, and their contentions in oral argument, it appears to 
the Court that the order and judgment of the Court of Chancery 
should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons set forth in 
its decision dated May 12, 2009.179  
The footnote that accompanied the opinion was slightly longer. 
The Court of Chancery determined . . . that [the] board . . . did 
not breach its duty of care in authorizing the corporation to enter 
into the Indenture Agreement, with its “proxy put” provision. That 
determination was correct, not only for the reasons made explicit in 
the Court’s opinion, but also for one that is implicit: no showing 
was made that approving the “proxy put” at that point in time 
would involve any reasonably foreseeable material risk to the 
corporation or its stockholders. That risk materialized only months 
later, and was aggravated by the unexpected, cataclysmic decline in 
the nation’s financial system and capital markets beginning in the 
Spring of 2008.180 
And at that, the board rejected the Pension Fund’s arguments 
and affirmed the Chancery Court’s decision. 
 
 177. See, e.g., San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 981 
A.2d 1173, 1173 n.2 (Del. 2009). 
 178. See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Brief at 7, San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. 
Amylin Pharms., Inc., 981 A.2d 1173 (Del. 2009) (No. 268). 
 179. Id. at 1173.The decision is outlined above in Part III.4. 
 180. Id. 
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V. DIRECTORS WHO APPROVE AGREEMENTS WITH PROXY PUTS 
SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO THE COMPELLING JUSTIFICATION 
STANDARD 
Chancellor Allen’s profound language from Blasius provides the 
proper framework for analyzing the legality of the proxy puts in 
Amylin, and all proxy puts generally: “The shareholder franchise is 
the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of 
directorial power rests.”181 He further reasoned that “it is clear that 
[the shareholder vote] is critical to the theory that legitimates the 
exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast 
aggregations of property that they do not own.”182 Because the 
proxy puts in Amylin infringed on the shareholder franchise’s 
authority in a contested election, I contend that the Delaware courts 
should have required the Amylin board to show a compelling 
justification for including them in the Indenture and the Credit 
Agreement. Moreover, I propose a rule that any time a board of 
directors enters into an agreement with a proxy put, it must show 
that it did so with a compelling justification. 
My proposed rule aligns with the policy underlying the Delaware 
courts’ opinions in Blasius and Liquid Audio. In criticizing the 
Amylin opinions, I do not contend that Vice Chancellor Lamb’s 
answer to the Pension Fund’s care claim was necessarily wrong, but I 
do assert that, in addressing it, he answered the wrong question. As 
Chancellor Allen reasoned in Blasius, the ordinary considerations 
that implicate the business judgment rule are not present in the 
shareholder voting context and were not present in Amylin.183 Even 
though, similar to the board in Blasius, the Amylin board likely did 
not breach its duty of care,184 the proxy puts’ infringement on 
shareholder voting posed a question of authority “as between the 
fiduciary and the beneficiary,” not a question of fiduciary duty.185 
 
 181. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 659. 
 184. As the court noted, by retaining sophisticated counsel, working intensely with 
management and investment bankers, and asking its counsel if there was anything unusual in 
the agreement, the board easily cleared the low gross negligence. Moreover, directors should 
not be expected to review every page of an agreement. See San Antonio Fire & Police Pension 
Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., C.A. No. 4444-VCL, at 26–27 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2009), 
available at http://law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/governance-cases/ 
Antonio-Fire-Police-Memorandum-Opinion.pdf. 
 185. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 658. 
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Because the proxy puts enabled the incumbent board to “thwart a 
shareholder majority,” they implicated a question of who had 
authority regarding a matter of internal corporate governance.186 
According to Chancellor Allen’s reasoning, the business judgment 
rule cannot apply in such circumstances, and the board must “bear[] 
the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for 
such action.”187  
My rule is also supported by the Liquid Audio interpretation of 
Blasius and its adoption into the Unocal test. The Liquid Audio 
holding fits Blasius into Unocal by requiring directors to 
demonstrate a compelling justification for any defensive measure that 
has the primary purpose of interfering with or impeding “the 
effective exercise of the shareholder franchise in a contested election 
for directors,” as a condition precedent to the Unocal reasonableness 
and proportionality inquiries.188 Proxy puts absolutely interfere with 
and impede the shareholder franchise’s right to participate in the 
proxy election of directors. In Amylin, because the company could 
not afford to pay off the 2007 notes at face value or handle the 
acceleration of the debt in the Credit Agreement, the two dissident 
slates were unable to run successful proxy campaigns. In fact, they 
eventually reduced their slates to a number that would not constitute 
a majority. The Delaware courts should not have had to answer 
questions of the board’s power and right to approve the slates, 
because the provisions themselves should not have been valid 
without a showing of compelling justification to include them in the 
agreements. 
While the facts of Blasius and Liquid Audio do not perfectly align 
with Amylin, the reasoning and underlying policy of the cases 
support my rule for proxy puts and its application in Amylin. The 
notable factual distinction in Amylin from both Liquid Audio and 
Blasius is that the Amylin directors allegedly approved of the 
Indenture and the Credit Agreement without knowing about the 
proxy put provisions, while the directors in the other cases acted 
intentionally, but in good faith.189 This distinction is of little 
consequence, however, to my proposed rule and to the underlying 
policy rationale from Blasius and Liquid Audio. Whether or not the 
 
 186. See id. at 660. 
 187. See id. at 661. 
 188. MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (Del. 2003). 
 189. See id. at 662. 
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directors knew that they were acting outside their authority does not 
change the fact that they were doing so. Directors should not have 
authority to approve a provision that would “thwart a shareholder 
majority,”190 “interfere with or impede the effective exercise of the 
shareholder franchise in a contested election for directors,”191 and 
ultimately entrench an incumbent board. Shareholders have only two 
key protections against inadequate business performance—selling 
their shares and voting.192 The Amylin board, by approving the 
Indenture and the Credit Agreement (both of which contained 
proxy puts) took one of those protections away. Therefore, their 
decision to do so must have been made with a compelling 
justification. 
The agency cost framework also demonstrates public policy 
reasons for requiring a compelling justification to employ proxy 
puts.193 As Kahan and Klausner’s analysis demonstrates, proxy puts 
are the “ideal management protective covenant,” and they almost 
assuredly increase the agency cost of equity without decreasing the 
agency cost of debt.194 While they likely give no additional protection 
to bondholders, they do provide them a supra-compensatory remedy 
if the puts are triggered.195 It is difficult to imagine a scenario where 
proxy puts should be allowed, and, like Chancellor Allen in Blasius, I 
see the advantage of clarity and predictability in a bright-line, per se 
rule invalidating proxy puts.196 However, as Chancellor Allen finally 
concluded,197 I recognize that it is impossible to foresee all scenarios 
in which a board could implement a proxy put. Therefore, I am 
satisfied with the high burden of requiring a board that uses a proxy 
put to show a compelling justification. 
Applying the compelling justification standard makes Amylin an 
easy case. The fact that the board did not even know that the 
provisions were in the agreements cuts against them in this test. 
How could they have had a compelling justification to put the 
provisions in when they were not even aware of their existence? 
 
 190. Id. at 660. 
 191. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d at 1132. 
 192. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659. 
 193. See supra Part II. 
 194. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 1, at 950. 
 195. See id. at 934–50. 
 196. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661. 
 197. See id. at 662. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/16/2010  3:58 PM 
767 A Critical Analysis of the Legality of Poison Puts 
 797 
There is no evidence that they used the proxy puts as negotiating 
leverage to obtain more favorable interest rates, or anything at all, in 
return. They were merely included as parts of long agreements. The 
board clearly had no compelling justification to include the proxy 
puts, and they therefore should have been invalidated. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The hostile takeover craze of the 1980s has slightly abated in the 
past twenty years, but the lasting effects of the decade are still felt. 
The antitakeover defenses that the ’80s spawned have affected 
corporate governance in complex and intriguing ways. Poison puts 
are no exception. 
 In San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Amylin’s board of directors employed a 
particular kind of poison put—a proxy put. Both Delaware courts 
refrained from truly confronting the legality of the proxy puts, as 
they deferred to the board’s business judgment in failing to identify 
and remove the provisions. I contend that the court erred in not 
requiring the board of directors to demonstrate a compelling 
justification for implementing the proxy puts. 
In this Note, I do not attempt to craft a comprehensive rule for 
all poison put provisions, but I do propose a rule for proxy puts. 
Because of the unique infringement that proxy puts impose on the 
shareholder franchise, any directors who enter into an agreement 
with a proxy put provision must show that they did so with a 
compelling justification. In Amylin, the board did not demonstrate a 
compelling justification, and, therefore, the proxy puts at issue 
should have been invalidated. 
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